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Abstract
We study a very general class of games — multi-dimensional aggregative games — which in
particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game
that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we
give an efficient weak mediator : a mechanism which has only the power to listen to reported types
and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that (a) it is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium
for every player to truthfully report their type to the mediator, and then follow its suggested
action; and (b) that when players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact, truthful
reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our solution applies even
in settings of incomplete information, and even when player types are arbitrary or worst-case
(i.e. not drawn from a common prior). We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially
private algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence
to equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of players n. We also
apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game.
Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust version of
the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational assumptions (no common
prior), yet provide a stronger solution concept (ex-post Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium). In
comparison to previous work, our main conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators
are a game theoretic object that exist in a wide variety of games – previously, they were only
known to exist in traffic routing games. We also give the first weak mediator that can implement
an equilibrium optimizing a linear objective function, rather than implementing a possibly worst-
case Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Games with a large number of players are almost always played, but only sometimes modeled, in
a setting of incomplete information. Consider, for example, the problem of selecting stocks for a
401k portfolio among the companies listed in the S&P500. Because stock prices are the result of
the aggregate decisions of millions of investors, this is a large multi-player strategic interaction,
but it is so decentralized that it is implausible to analyze it in a complete information setting
(in which every player knows the types or utilities of all of his opponents), or even in a Bayesian
setting (in which every agent shares common knowledge of a prior distribution from which player
types are drawn). How players will behave in such interactions is unclear; even under settings of
complete information, there remains the potential problem of coordinating or selecting a particular
equilibrium among many.
One solution to this problem, recently proposed by Kearns et al. [2014] and Rogers and Roth
[2014], is to modify the game by introducing a weak mediator, which essentially only has the power
to listen and to give advice. Players can ignore the mediator, and play in the original game as
they otherwise would have. Alternately, they can use the mediator, in which case they can report
their type to it (although they have the freedom to lie). The mediator provides them with a
suggested action that they can play in the original game, but they have the freedom to disregard
the suggestion, or to use it in some strategic way (not necessarily following it). The goal is to design
a mediator such that good behavior – that is, deciding to use the mediator, truthfully reporting
one’s type, and then faithfully following the suggested action – forms an ex-post Nash equilibrium
in the mediated game, and that the resulting play forms a Nash equilibrium of the original complete
information game, induced by the actual (but unknown) player types. A way to approximately
achieve this goal – which was shown in Kearns et al. [2014], Rogers and Roth [2014] – is to design
a mediator which computes a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by the reported player types
under a stability constraint known as differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006]. Prior to our work,
this was only known to be possible in the special case of large, unweighted congestion games.
In this paper, we extend this approach to a much more general class of games known as multi-
dimensional aggregative games (which among other things, generalize both anonymous games and
weighted congestion games). In such a game, there is a vector of linear functions of players’ joint
actions called an aggregator . Each player’s utility is then a possibly non-linear function of the
aggregator vector and their own action. For example, in an investing game, the imbalance between
buyers and sellers of a stock, which is a linear function of actions, may be used in the utility
functions to compute prices, which are a non-linear function of the imbalances (see Section 4 for
details). In an anonymous game, the aggregator function represents the number of players playing
each action. In a weighted congestion game, the aggregator function represents the total weight of
players on each of the facilities. Our results apply to any large aggregative game, meaning that any
player’s unilateral change in action can have at most a bounded influence on the utility of any other
player, and the bound on this influence should be a diminishing function in the number of players
in the game. Conceptually, our paper is the first to show that weak mediators are a game-theoretic
object that exists in a large, general class of games: previously, although defined, weak mediators
were only known to exist in traffic routing games Rogers and Roth [2014].
This line of work can be viewed as giving robust versions of the Revelation Principle, which
can implement Nash equilibria of the complete information game using a “direct revelation medi-
ator,” but without needing the existence of a prior type distribution. Compared to the Revelation
Principle, which generically requires such a distribution and implements a Bayes Nash equilibrium,
truth-telling forms an ex-post Nash equilibrium in our setting. We include a comparison to previous
work in Table 1.
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Finally, another important contribution of our work is that we are the first to demonstrate the
existence of weak mediators (in any game) that have the power to optimize over an arbitrary linear
function of the actions, and hence able to implement near optimal equilibria under such objective
functions, rather than just implementing worst-case Nash equilibria.
Mechanism Class of Games Common
Prior?
Mediator
Strength
Equilibrium
Imple-
mented
Revelation
Principle
[Myerson, 1981]
Any Finite Game Yes Weak Bayes Nash
Kearns et al.
[2014]
Any Large Game No Strong Correlated
Rogers and
Roth [2014]
Large Congestion Games No Weak Nash
This Work Aggregative Games No Weak Nash
Table 1: Summary of truthful mechanisms for various classes of games and solution concepts. Note
that a “weak” mediator does not require the ability to verify player types. A “strong” mediator
does. Weak mediators are preferred.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Our main result is the existence of a mediator which makes truthful reporting of one’s type and
faithful following of the suggested action (which we call the “good behavior” strategy) an ex-post
Nash equilibrium in the mediated version of any aggregative game, thus implementing a Nash
equilibrium of the underlying game of complete information. Unlike the previous work in this
line [Kearns et al., 2014, Rogers and Roth, 2014], we do not have to implement an arbitrary
(possibly worst-case) Nash equilibrium, but can implement a Nash equilibrium which optimizes
any linear objective (in the player’s actions) of our choosing. We here state our results under the
assumption that any player’s action has influence bounded by (1/n) on other’s utility, but our
results hold more generally, parameterized by the “largeness” of the game.
Theorem 1 (Informal). In a d-dimensional aggregative game of n players and m actions, there
exists a mediator that makes good behavior an η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium, and imple-
ments a Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete information game that optimizes any linear
objective function to within η, where
η = O
( √
d
n1/3
· polylog(n,m, d)
)
.
It is tempting to think that the fact that players only have small influence on one another’s
utility function is sufficient to make any algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium of the game
a suitable weak mediator, but this is not so (see Kearns et al. [2014] for an example). What we
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need out of a mediator is that any single agent’s report should have little effect on the algorithm
computing the Nash equilibrium, rather than on the payoffs of the other players.
The underlying tool that we use is differential privacy, which enforces the stability condition
we need on the equilibrium computation algorithm. Our main technical contribution is designing a
(jointly) differentially private algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in aggregative
games. The algorithm that we design runs in time polynomial in the number of players, but
exponential in the dimension of the aggregator function. We note that since aggregative games
generalize anonymous games, where the dimension of the aggregator function is the number of
actions in the anonymous game, this essentially matches the best known running time for computing
Nash equilibria in anonymous games, even non-privately [Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, 2008].
Computing exact Nash equilibria in these games is known to be PPAD complete [Chen et al.,
2014].
In the process of proving this result, we develop several techniques which may be of independent
interest. First, we give the first algorithm for computing equilibria of multi-dimensional aggregative
games (efficient for constant dimensional games) even in the absence of privacy constraints — past
work in this area has focused on the single dimensional case Kearns and Mansour [2002], Babichenko
[2013]. Second, in order to implement this algorithm privately, we develop the first technique for
solving a certain class of linear programs under the constraint of joint differential privacy.
We also give similar results for a class of one-dimensional aggregative games that permit a more
general aggregation function and rely on different techniques (Section 5), and we show how our
main result can be applied to equilibrium selection in a multi-commodity market (Section 4).
1.2 Related Work
Conceptually, our work is related to the classic Revelation Principle of Myerson [1981], in that we
seek to implement equilibrium behavior in a game via a “mediated” direct revelation mechanism.
Our work is part of a line, starting with Kearns et al. [2014] and continuing with Rogers and Roth
[2014], that attempts to give a more robust reduction, without the need to assume a prior on types.
Kearns et al. [2014] showed how to privately compute correlated equilibria (and hence implement
this agenda) in arbitrary large games. The private computation of correlated equilibrium turns
out to give the desired reduction to a direct revelation mechanism only when the mediator has
the power to verify types. Rogers and Roth [2014] rectified this deficiency by privately computing
Nash equilibria, but their result is limited to large unweighted congestion games. In this paper, we
substantially generalize the class of games in which we can privately compute Nash equilibria (and
hence solve the equilibrium selection problem with a direct-revelation mediator).
This line of work is also related to “strategyproofness in the large,” introduced by Azevedo and
Budish [2012], which has similar goals. In comparison to this work, we do not require that player
types be drawn from a distribution over the type-space, do not require any smoothness condition
on the set of equilibria of the game, are algorithmically constructive, and do not require our game
to be nearly as large. Generally, their results require the number of agents n to be larger than the
size of the action set and the size of the type set. In contrast, we only require n to be as large as
the logarithm of the number of actions, and require no bound at all on the size of the type space
(which can even be infinite).
Our work is also related to the literature on mediators in games [Monderer and Tennenholtz,
2003, 2009]. In contrast to our main goal (which is to implement solution concepts of the complete
information game in settings of incomplete information), this line of work aims to modify the
equilibrium structure of the complete information game. It does so by introducing a mediator,
which can coordinate agent actions if they choose to opt in using the mediator. Mediators can
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be used to convert Nash equilibria into dominant strategy equilibria [Monderer and Tennenholtz,
2003], or implement equilibrium that are robust to collusion [Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2009].
Ashlagi et al. [2009] considers mediators in games of incomplete information, in which agents can
misrepresent their type to the mediators. Our notion of a mediator is related, but our mediators
require substantially less power than the ones from this literature. For example, our mechanisms do
not need the power to make payments [Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2003], or the power to enforce
suggested actions [Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2009]. Like the mediators of Ashlagi et al. [2009],
ours are designed to work in settings of incomplete information and so do not need the power to
verify agent types — but our mediators are weaker, in that they can only make suggestions (i.e.
players do not need to cede control to our weak mediators).
The computation of equilibria in aggregative games (also known as summarization games) was
studied in Kearns and Mansour [2002], which gave efficient algorithms and learning dynamics con-
verging to equilibria in the 1-dimensional case. Babichenko [2013] also studies learning dynamics in
this class of games and shows that in the 1-dimensional setting, sequential best response dynamics
converge quickly to equilibrium. Our paper is the first to give algorithms for equilibrium com-
putation in the multi-dimensional setting, which generalizes many well studied classes of games,
including anonymous games. The running time of our algorithm is polynomial in the number of
players n and exponential in the dimension of the aggregation function d, which essentially matches
the best known running time for equilibrium computation in anonymous games [Daskalakis and
Papadimitriou, 2008].
We use a number of tools from differential privacy Dwork et al. [2006], as well as develop
some new ones. In particular, we use the advanced composition theorem of Dwork et al. [2010],
the exponential mechanism from McSherry and Talwar [2007], and the sparse vector technique
introduced by Dwork et al. [2009] (refined in Hardt and Rothblum [2010] and abstracted into
its current form in Dwork and Roth [2014]). We introduce a new technique for solving linear
programs under joint differential privacy, which extends a line of work (solving linear programs
under differential privacy) initiated by Hsu et al. [2014b].
Finally, our work relates to a long line of work initiated by McSherry and Talwar [2007] using
differential privacy as a tool and desideratum in mechanism design. In addition to works already
cited, this includes Nissim et al. [2012b,a], Xiao [2013], Ghosh and Ligett [2013], Chen et al. [2013],
Blum et al. [2014], Kannan et al. [2015] among others. For a survey of this area see Pai and Roth
[2013].
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Aggregative Games
Consider an n-player game with action set A consisting of m actions and a (possibly infinite) type
space T indexing utility functions. Let ~x = (xi, ~x−i) denote a strategy profile in which player i
plays action xi and the remaining players play strategy profile ~x−i. Each player i has a utility
function, u : T ×An → [−1, 1], where a player with type ti experiences utility u(ti, ~x) when players
play according to ~x. When it is clear from context, we will use shorthand and write ui(~x) to denote
u(ti, ~x), the utility of player i at strategy profile ~x.
The utility functions in aggregative games can be defined in terms of a multi-dimensional ag-
gregator function S : An → [−W,W ]d, which represents a compact “sufficient statistic” to compute
player utilities. In particular, each player’s utility function can be represented as a function only
of her own action xi and the aggregator of the strategy profile ~x: ui(~x) = ui(xi, S(~x)). We also
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assume W to be polynomially bounded by n and m. In aggregative games, the function Sk for each
coordinate k ∈ [d], is an additively separable function: Sk(~x) =
∑n
i=1 f
k
i (xi).
1
Similar to the setting of Kearns and Mansour [2002] and Babichenko [2013], we focus on γ-
aggregative games, in which each player has a bounded influence on the aggregator:
max
i
max
xi,x′i∈A
∥∥S(xi, ~x−i)− S(x′i, ~x−i)∥∥∞ ≤ γ, for all ~x−i ∈ An−1.
That is, the greatest change a player can unilaterally cause to the aggregator is bounded by γ.
With our motivation to study large games, we assume γ diminishes with the population size n. We
also assume that all utility functions are 1-Lipschitz with respect to the aggregator: for all xi ∈ A,
|ui(xi, s)− ui(xi, s′)| ≤ ‖s− s′‖∞.2
For γ-aggregative games, we can express the aggregator more explicitly as
Sk(~x) = γ
n∑
i=1
fki (xi),
where fki (xi) is the influence of player i’s action xi on the k-th aggregator function, and also
|fki (xi)| ≤ 1 for all actions i ∈ [n] and xi ∈ A. Let fkij = fki (aj), where aj denotes the j-th action
in A.
We say that player i is playing an η-best response to ~x if ui(~x) ≥ ui(x′i, ~x−i)− η, for all x′i ∈ A.
A strategy profile ~x is an η-pure strategy Nash equilibrium if all players are playing an η-best
response in ~x. We also consider mixed strategies, which are defined by probability distributions
over the action set. For any profile of mixed strategies, given by a product distribution ~p, we can
define expected utility ui(~p) = E~x∼~p ui(~x) and the expected aggregator
Sk(~p) = E
~x∼~p
Sk(~x) = γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkij pij = γ 〈fk, ~p〉. (1)
The support of a mixed strategy p, denoted Supp(~pi), is the set of actions that are played with
non-zero probabilities. A mixed strategy profile ~p is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if ui(~p) ≥
E~x−i∼~p−i ui(x′i, ~x−i) for all i ∈ [n] and x′i ∈ A.
For each aggregator s, we define the aggregative best response3 for player i to s as ~BAi(s) =
arg maxxi∈A{ui(xi, s)}, breaking ties arbitrarily. We define the η-aggregative best response set for
player i to s as
η- ~BAi(s) = {xi ∈ A|ui(xi, s) ≥ max
x′i
ui(x
′
i, s)− η}
to be the set of all actions that are at most η worse than player i’s exact aggregative best response.
Remark 1. Note that best response is played against the other players’ actions x−i, but aggregative
best response is played against the aggregator value s. Aggregative best response ignores the effect of
the player’s action on the aggregator, which is bounded by γ; the player reasons about the utility of
playing different actions as if the aggregator value were promised to be s. Nevertheless, aggregative
1In the economics literature, aggregative games have more restricted aggregator function: Sk(~x) =
∑n
i=1 xi. The
games we study are more general, and sometimes referred to as generalized aggregative games.
2Note that the influence that any single player’s action has on the utility of others is also bounded by γ. If
γ = o(1/n), then any player’s utility is essentially independent of other players’ actions. Therefore, we further
assume that γ = Ω(1/n) for the problem to be interesting. This will also simplify some statements.
3Sometimes called best react [Babichenko, 2013], and apparent best response [Kearns and Mansour, 2002].
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best response and best response can translate to each other with only an additive loss of γ in the
approximation factor. Furthermore, aggregative best responses to different aggregators can translate
to each other as long as the corresponding aggregators are close. If ‖s− s′‖∞ ≤ α, then the actions
in η- ~BA(s) are also in (η + 2α)- ~BA(s′). We state these results more formally in the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let ~x be a strategy profile such that player i’s action xi is an η-best response. Then xi
is also an (η + γ)-aggregative best response to S(~x).
Proof. Let s = S(~x) and s′ = S(a, x−i) for some deviation a 6= xi. Since xi is an η-best response, we
know that ui(xi, s) ≥ ui(a, s′)−η. By the bounded influence of player i, we know that ‖s−s′‖∞ ≤ γ.
Also, by the Lipschitz property of ui, we have that |ui(a, s′) − ui(a, s)| ≤ γ. It follows that
ui(a, s
′) ≥ ui(a, s)− γ, and therefore u(xi, s) ≥ ui(a, s)− γ − η.
Lemma 2. Let ~x be a strategy profile such that every player is playing η-aggregative best response
to S(~x). Then we know that each player is playing (η + γ)-best response, and hence ~x forms a
(η + γ)-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let s = S(~x) and s′ = S(a, x−i) for some deviation a 6= xi. Since xi is an η-aggregative
best response, we know u(xi, s) ≥ ui(a, s)− η. We know that ‖s− s′‖∞ ≤ γ by bounded influence
of i. Then by the Lipschitz property of ui, ui(a, s) ≥ ui(a, s′) − γ. It follows that ui(xi, s) ≥
ui(a, s
′)− η − γ.
Lemma 3. Suppose action xi is an η-aggregative best response to s for player i. Let s
′ be aggregator
such that ‖s− s′‖∞ ≤ α. Then xi is an (η + 2α)-aggregative best response to s′.
Proof. Let a 6= xi be some deviation for player i. Since xi is an η-aggregative best response to s,
we have ui(xi, s) ≥ ui(a, s)− η. By the Lipschitz property of ui, ui(xi, s′) ≥ ui(xi, s)− α and also
ui(a, s) ≥ ui(a, s′)− α. Combining these inequalities, we have ui(xi, s′) ≥ ui(a, s′)− η − 2α.
2.2 Mediated Games
We now define games modified by the introduction of a mediator. A mediator is an algorithm
M : (T ∪ {⊥})n → An which takes as input reported types (or ⊥ for any player who declines to
use the mediator), and outputs a suggested action to each player. Given an aggregative game G,
we construct a new game GM induced by the mediator M . Informally, in GM , players have several
options: they can opt-out of the mediator (i.e. report ⊥) and select an action independently of
it. Alternately they can opt-in and report to it some type (not necessarily their true type), and
receive a suggested action ri. They are free to follow this suggestion or use it in some other way:
they play an action fi(ri) for some arbitrary function fi : A → A. Formally, the game GM has an
action set Ai for each player i defined as Ai = A′i ∪ A′′i , where
A′i = {(ti, fi) : ti ∈ T , fi : A → A} and A′′i = {(⊥, fi) : fi is constant}.
Players’ utilities in the mediated game are simply their expected utilities induced by the
actions they play in the original game. Formally, they have utility functions u′i: u
′
i(t, f) =
E~x∼M(t)[ui(f(~x))]. We are interested in finding mediators such that good behavior is an ex-post
Nash equilibrium in the mediated game. We first define an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
6
Definition 1 (Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium). A collection of strategies {σi : T → Ai}ni=1 forms an
η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium if for every type vector t ∈ T n, and for every player i and
action xi ∈ Ai:
u′i(σi(ti), σ−i(t−i)) ≥ u′i(xi, σ−i(t−i))− η
That is, it forms an η-approximate Nash equilibrium for every possible vector of types.
Note that ex-post Nash equilibrium is a very strong solution concept for incomplete information
games because it does not require players to know a prior distribution over types.
In a mediated game, we would like players to truthfully report their type, and then faithfully
follow the suggested action of the mediator. We call this good behavior. Formally, the good behavior
strategy is defined as gi(ti) = (ti, id) where id : A → A is the identity function – i.e. it truthfully
reports a player’s type to the mediator, and applies the identity function to its suggested action.
In order to achieve this, we use the notion of joint differential privacy defined in Kearns et al.
[2014] (adapted from differential privacy, defined in Dwork et al. [2006] and presented here in
Appendix A), as a privacy measure for mechanisms on agents’ private data (types). Intuitively, it
guarantees that the output to all other agents excluding player i is insensitive to i’s private type,
so the mechanism protects i’s private information from arbitrary coalitions of adversaries.
Definition 2 (Joint Differential Privacy Kearns et al. [2014]). Two type profiles t and t′ are i-
neighbors if they differ only in the i-th component. An algorithm M : T n → An is (ε, δ)-joint
differentially private if for every i, for every pair of i-neighbors t, t′ ∈ T n, and for every subset of
outputs S ⊆ An−1,
Pr[M(t)−i ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(t′)−i ∈ S] + δ.
If δ = 0, we say that M is ε-jointly differentially private.
We here quote a theorem of Rogers and Roth [2014], inspired by Kearns et al. [2014] which
motivates our study of private equilibrium computation.
Theorem 2 (Rogers and Roth [2014], Kearns et al. [2014]). Let M be a mechanism satisfying
(ε, δ)-joint differential privacy, that on any input type profile t with probability 1− β computes an
α-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the complete information game G(t) defined by
type profile t. Then the “good behavior” strategy g = (g1, . . . , gn) forms an η-approximate ex-post
Nash equilibrium of the mediated game GM for
η = α+ 2(2ε+ β + δ).
Our private equilibrium computation relies on two private algorithmic tools, sparse vector mech-
anism (called Sparse) and exponential mechanism (called EXP), which allows us to access agents’
types in a privacy-preserving manner. (Full details in Appendix A.)
3 Private Equilibrium Computation
Let G be a d-dimensional γ-aggregative game, and L : An → R be a γ-Lipschitz4 linear loss function:
L(~x) = γ
∑
i
`i(xi) and L(~p) = γ E
~x∼~p
L(~x) = γ
∑
i
〈pij , `ij〉.
where 0 ≤ `i(aj) ≤ 1 for all actions aj ∈ A, and `ij = `i(aj).
4This can be achieved by scaling.
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Given any ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn), let E(ζ) be the set of ζ-approximate pure strategy Nash equi-
libria in the game G,5 and let
OPT(ζ) = min{L(~x) | ~x ∈ E(ζ)}.
We give the following main result:
Theorem 3. For any ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn), there exists a mediator M that makes good behavior
an (ζ + η)-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game GM , and implements an
approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium ~x of the underlying complete information game with
L(~x) ≤ OPT(ζ) + η, where
η = O
(
n1/3γ2/3
√
d · polylog(n,m, d)
)
.
Recall that the quantity γ is diminishing in n; whenever γ = O(1/n1/2+ε) for ε > 0, the
approximation factor η tends towards zero as n grows large. Plugging in γ = 1/n and ζ =
γ
√
8n log(2mn) recovers the bound in Theorem 1.
This result follows from instantiating Theorem 2 with an algorithm that computes an approx-
imate equilibrium under joint differential privacy, presented in Algorithm 1 as PRESL (Private
Equilibrium Selection).6 We give here an informal description of our algorithm, absent privacy
concerns, and then describe how we implement it privately, deferring the formal treatment to
Appendix C.
The main object of interest in our algorithm is the set-valued function
Vξ(ŝ) = {S(~p) | for each i,Supp(pi) ⊆ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ)},
which maps aggregator values ŝ to the set of aggregator values that arise when players are ran-
domizing between ξ-aggregative best responses to ŝ. An approximate equilibrium will yield an
aggregator ŝ such that ŝ ∈ Vξ(ŝ), so we wish to find such a fixed point for Vξ (the value of ξ will be
determined in the analysis, see Appendix C). Note that pure strategy Nash equilibria correspond to
such fixed points, but a-priori, it is not clear that fixed points of this function (which may involve
mixed strategies) are mixed strategy Nash equilibria. This is because player utility functions need
not be linear in the aggregator, and so a best response to the expected value of the aggregator need
not be a best response to the corresponding distribution over aggregators. However, as we will
show, we can safely round such fixed points to approximate pure strategy Nash equilibria, because
the aggregator will be well concentrated under rounding.
For every fixed value ŝ, the problem of determining whether ŝ ∈ Vξ(ŝ) is a linear program
(because the aggregator is linear), and although Supp(pi) ⊆ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ) is not a convex constraint in
ŝ, the aggregative best responses are fixed for each fixed value of ŝ. The first step of our algorithm
simply searches through a discretized grid of all possible aggregators X = {−W,−W +α, . . . ,W −
α}d, and solves this linear program to check if some point ŝ ∈ Vξ(ŝ). This results in a set of
aggregators S that are induced by the approximate equilibria of the game. Let pij denote the
probability that player i plays the j-th action. Then the linear program we need to solve is as
5We will show that E(ζ) is non-empty for ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn) in Appendix C.
6We also present the full details of the non-private algorithm to compute equilibrium for aggregative games in
Appendix D.
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follows:
∀k ∈ [d], ŝk − α ≤ γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkijpij ≤ ŝk + α
∀i ∈ [n], ∀j ∈ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ), 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ [n], ∀j /∈ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ), pij = 0
(2)
Next, we need to find a particular equilibrium (an assignment of actions to players) that opti-
mizes our cost-objective function L. This is again a linear program (since the objective function is
linear) for each ŝ. Hence, for each fixed point ŝ ∈ Vξ(ŝ) we simply solve this linear program, and
out of all of the candidate equilibria, output the one with the lowest cost. Finally, this results in
mixed strategies for each of the players, and we round this to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
by sampling from each player’s mixed strategy. This does not substantially harm the quality of
the equilibrium; because of the low sensitivity of the aggregator, it is well concentrated around
its expectation under this rounding. The running time of this algorithm is dominated by the grid
search for the aggregator fixed point ŝ, which takes time exponential in d. Solving each linear
program can be done in time polynomial in all of the game parameters.
Making this algorithm satisfy joint differential privacy is more difficult. There are two main
steps. The first is to identify the fixed point ŝ ∈ Vξ(ŝ) that corresponds the lowest cost equilib-
rium. There are exponentially in d many candidate aggregators to check, and with naive noise
addition we would have to pay for this exponential factor in our accuracy bound. However, we take
advantage of the fact that we only need to output a single aggregator – the one corresponding to
the lowest objective value equilibrium – and so the sparse vector mechanism Sparse (described in
Appendix A.1) can be brought to bear, allowing us to pay only linearly in d in the accuracy bound.
The second step is more challenging, and requires a new technique: we must actually solve
the linear program corresponding to ŝ, and output to each player the strategy they should play in
equilibrium. The output strategy profile must satisfy joint differential privacy. To do this, we give
a general method for solving a class of linear programs (containing in particular, LPs of the form
(2)) under joint differential privacy, which may be of independent interest. This algorithm, which
we call DistMW (described in Appendix B), is a distributed version of the classic multiplicative
weights (MW) technique for solving LPs [Arora et al., 2012]. The algorithm can be analyzed
by viewing each agent as controlling the variables corresponding to their own mixed strategies,
and performing their multiplicative weights updates in isolation (and ensuring that their mixed
strategies always fall within their best response set ξ- ~BAi(ŝ)). At every round, the algorithm
aggregates the current solution maintained by each player, and then identifies a coordinate in
which the constraints are far from being satisfied. The algorithm uses the exponential mechanism
EXP (described in Appendix A.2) to pick such a coordinate while maintaining the privacy of the
players’ actions. The identification of such a coordinate is sufficient for each player to update
their own variables. Privacy then follows by combining the privacy guarantee of the exponential
mechanism with a bound on the convergence time of the multiplicative weights update rule. The
fact that we can solve this LP in a distributed manner to get joint differential privacy (rather than
standard differential privacy) crucially depends on the fact that the sensitivity γ of the aggregator
is small. The algorithm DistMW will find a set of strategies that approximately satisfy the linear
program – the violation on each coordinate is bounded by
E = O
(
nγ2
ε
polylog
(
n,m, d,
1
β
,
1
δ
))1/2
.
The algorithm PRESL has the following guarantee:
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ALGORITHM 1: Private Equilibrium Selection via LP: PRESL(t, ζ, L, ε, δ, β)
Data: A type vector t, comparator parameter ζ, linear cost function L, privacy parameters (ε, δ),
confidence parameter β
Result: An O˜
(
ζ +
(
√
nε+d)γ
ε
)
-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium with cost objective no
more than OPT(ζ) + O˜
(
(
√
nε+d)γ
ε
)
Initialize: discretization resolution α = E1 + E2, where
E1 =
100γ
ε
(
(d+ 1) log(2W ) log(n) + log
(
6
β
))
,
E2 = 100
(
nγ2
ε
log
(
3d
β
)
log(n)
√
log(m) ln
(
1
δ
))1/2
/* Find a fixed point ŝ ∈ Vξ(ŝ) that corresponds to the lowest cost equilibrium */
let {a(ŝ, ŷ)} = Sparse(t,Q, α+ E1, 1, ε); // Q formally defined in Appendix C.
if all a(ŝ, ŷ) =⊥ then
Abort;
else
we have (ŝ, ŷ) such that a(ŝ) 6=⊥;
let ~p = DistMW(LP (ŝ, ŷ), ε, δ, α, β/3);
let ~x be an action profile sampled from the product distribution ~p;
Output: ~x;
Theorem 4. Let ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn), ε, δ, β ∈ (0, 1). PRESL(t, ζ, L, ε, δ, β) satisfies (2ε, δ)-joint
differential privacy, and, with probability at least 1 − β, computes a (ζ + 12α)-approximate pure
strategy equilibrium ~x such that L(~x) < OPT(ζ) + 5α, where
α = O
(
(
√
nε+ d) γ
ε
polylog (n,m, d, 1/β, 1/δ)
)
.
We defer the full proof and technical details to Appendix C.
Remark 2. The running time of this algorithm is exponential in d, the dimension of the aggregative
game. For games of fixed dimension (where d is constant), this yields a polynomial time algorithm.
This exponential dependence on the dimension matches the best known running time for (non-
privately) computing equilibrium in anonymous games by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [2008],
which is a sub-class of aggregative games.
Theorem 3 then follows by instantiating Theorem 2 with PRESL
(
t, ζ, L, n1/3γ2/3d1/2, 1n ,
1
n
)
–
i.e. by setting ε = n1/3γ2/3d1/2 and δ = β = 1n .
4 An Application to Multi-Commodity Markets
Here we give an application of our main result to a natural market-based game, in which aggregator
functions are used to compute non-linear prices.
Consider a market with d types of goods or contracts, which agents can either buy or sell short
(i.e. on each contract, an agent can be either long, short, or neutral, and so we can think of actions
as being vectors a ∈ A = {−1, 0, 1}d). In aggregate, the actions of all n players will lead to a
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price for each contract, represented by a vector q ∈ [0, 1]d. Agents have (potentially complicated)
valuation functions of their positions in the market, modeled as arbitrary functions vi : A → [−d, d],
and utilities which are quasilinear in money. Note that such valuation functions can model arbitrary
complementarity and substitute relationships between contracts. As a result, the equilibria in this
market can be complex and diverse, and equilibrium selection becomes a problem.
Central to the game is a market maker who sets prices for each contract as a function of the
demand. The precise pricing rule that the market maker uses determines the structure of the
equilibria of the market. In both real markets and our idealized game, one of the market maker’s
key objectives is to choose a pricing rule that minimizes his worst-case loss — i.e. the loss he
might suffer over the buy and sell decisions of the market participants (defined precisely below). A
natural and realistic goal is for this loss to be sublinear in the number n of participants or trades.
For example, in random-walk models of price movements it is typical for market maker loss to be
on the order of
√
n after n steps or trades. Our model is agnostic to the nature of the commodities
being bought and sold — these could, for example, be contracts paying off as a function of the
realization of future events, making this a combinatorial prediction market. See Chakraborty and
Kearns [2011] and Chen and Vaughan [2010] for analyses of market maker loss in both traditional
finance and prediction market models, respectively.
In the following, we show how to phrase the market described here as an aggregative game. We
implement a market maker that makes truthful reporting an approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium,
and computes an asymptotic Nash equilibrium of the underlying market, all while guaranteeing that
the market maker has loss bounded by O(n1/2+ε) per commodity, for any constant ε > 0 (i.e. almost
achieving an overall loss O(d
√
n)).
4.1 Instantiation of the Market as an Aggregative Game
We will formalize this setting as an n-player γ-aggregative game. The action set of each player
is A = {−1, 0, 1}d, where an action is a d-dimensional vector of long, short, or neutral decisions
(a portfolio), where 1 and −1 in the k-th coordinate respectively indicate buying and selling a
unit of the k-th security. Player i’s private type is described by her private valuation function
vi : A → [−d, d] that determines her value for any portfolio of d securities, held in positive or
negative unit quantities.
Given any strategy profile ~x, the imbalance in each security is the number agents buying minus
the number of agents selling: Ik(~x) =
∑
i(xi)k. If the price of security k is qk and aj = 1, then the
player pays qk; if aj = −1, the player is paid qk; otherwise, the player receives no payment. The
price qk for each security is a (nonlinear) function of the imbalance vector I parameterized by λ:
qk(I) =

0 if Ik <
−λ
2
Ik/λ+ 1/2 if
−λ
2 ≤ Ik ≤ λ2
1 if Ik >
λ
2
(3)
This simple “hinge” pricing rule is linear with slope λ in a symmetric range of imbalances around
0, and saturates at a price of 1 in the case of overdemand (too many buyers) or 0 in the case
of underdemand (too many sellers). We note that all the results discussed here also hold for the
standard exponential pricing rule often used in prediction markets Chen and Vaughan [2010].
To apply our main result, we define our aggregator to be S(~x) = I(~x)/λ. Conversely, when
the aggregator has value s, the imbalance vector is λs and each player i’s payoff function (after
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Figure 1: Hinge Pricing Rule
rescaling) for playing action xi is
ui(xi, s) =
1
2d
(vi(xi)− 〈xi, q(λs)〉) .7
For any fixed action xi, the payoff ui is a 1/2-Lipschitz function of price vector q, and the price
vector q is an (1/λ)-Lipschitz function of the imbalance I, which in turn is a λ-Lipschitz function of
the aggregator. Therefore, the payoff is a 1-Lipschitz function of the aggregator.8 Here the range
of the aggregator is [−n/λ, n/λ]d, and each player has bounded influence γ = 1/λ.
4.2 Equilibrium Selection and Market Maker’s Loss
For each security k, if Ik is positive, then there are Ik more buyers than sellers, and the market
maker must sell to these players at price qk(I). The market maker will have to pay the maximum
price of 1 to procure an extra copy of the item for each player in the worst case, for a potential loss
of `k = Ik(1 − qk(I)). Conversely, if Ik is negative, then there are Ik more sellers than buyers, so
the market maker must buy from these players at price qk(I), for a potential loss of `k = −Ik qk(I).
In total, the market maker’s worst-case loss is
∑d
k=1 `k.
Now consider a mediated game in this market in which the market maker wishes to elicit
private valuation functions from all players and make buy/sell recommendations to each player.
We have the freedom to set the pricing rule via choice of the parameter λ, but are also faced with a
bicriteria problem; we need to set prices to minimize the potential loss of the market maker, while
still incentivizing truthful reporting from the players. Here, we demonstrate a trade-off between
incentives and market maker’s potential loss. First, we have the following lemma which bounds the
market maker’s loss as a function of λ.
Lemma 4. The loss `k for the market maker in each security k under the pricing rule defined in
Equation (3) is bounded by λ/16.
Proof. Suppose Ik > 0. The loss
`k = Ik(1− qk(I)) ≤ Ik(1− Ik/λ− 1/2)
= Ik(1/2− Ik/λ)
= −1/λ (Ik − λ/4)2 + λ/16 ≤ λ/16.
7We normalize the utility function by 1/2d to ensure that ui ∈ [−1, 1], so that it fits into the setting defined
in Section 2.1.
8In fact, the payoff is a 1/2-Lipschitz function of the aggregator, which is a strictly stronger condition.
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Suppose Ik < 0, we also have
`k = Ik(−qk(I)) ≤ Ik(−Ik/λ− 1/2)
= −1/λ (Ik + λ/4)2 + λ/16 ≤ λ/16.
Thus, the loss is always bounded by λ/16.
In order to guarantee sub-linear loss in each good, the market maker needs to set λ = o(n).
Furthermore, since we have a (1/λ)-aggregative game with each player’s action set consisting of 3d
actions, the market maker can use PRESL as a mediator to incentivize truthful reporting.
Corollary 1. PRESL as our market maker makes each player truthfully reporting their valuation
function and following the market maker’s recommendation form an η-approximate ex-post Nash
equilibrium, where
η = O
(√
d
(( n
λ2
)1/3
+
( n
λ2
)1/2) · polylog(n, d)) .
This result follows by instantiating Theorem 2 with ζ =
√
8nd log(3n)/λ. For a fixed number
of commodities d, we get asymptotic truthfulness as long as the market maker sets λ to be at least
n1/2+ε for any ε > 0. With this setting of λ, we also guarantee that the market maker experiences
worst-case loss at most O(n1/2+ε) per good.
5 Single Dimensional (Quasi)-Aggregative Games
In this section, we consider a more general class of games – quasi-aggregative games, in which the
aggregator S is not required to have a linear structure as in aggregative games. We focus on γ-
quasi-aggregative games with a one-dimensional aggregator S : An → [−W,W ], and assume the
same properties of bounded influence and Lipschitz utilities.9 We have the following result:
Theorem 5. Let G be a single dimensional γ-quasi-aggregative game for some γ < 1. There exists
a mediator M that makes good behavior an η-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated
game GM , and implements a Nash equilibrium ~x of the underlying complete information game,
where
η = O (
√
γ · polylog(n,m)) .
Similar to Section 3, our mediator is a jointly differentially private algorithm that computes an
approximate Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is a private implementation of existing algorithms
[Kearns and Mansour, 2002, Babichenko, 2013], so we use different techniques for these single-
dimensional games. Under certain assumptions, we can also select equilibrium with respect to any
Lipschitz objective function of the aggregator (Appendix E.1).
5.1 Private Equilibrium Computation
Our algorithm PSummNash, presented in Algorithm 2, is a privatized version of the SummNash
algorithm proposed in Kearns and Mansour [2002], that computes an approximate Nash equilibrium
under joint differential privacy.
We will first briefly discuss the main idea of SummNash, with reference to Figure 2. The main
object of interest is the function V defined on the aggregator space such that
V (s) = S( ~BA(s)),
9This is identical to the setting in Kearns and Mansour [2002] and Babichenko [2013].
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X
Y
Figure 2: A hypothetical plot of the function V . The ticks on the X axis correspond to the
discretized points of aggregators Z = {−W,−W + α, . . . ,W − α}, and the height of the blue
intervals correspond to the values of V evaluated at these points (left endpoint of each interval).
The diagonal line correspond to line Y = X. The point labeled A is an example of a horizontal
crossing the algorithm looks for in stage 1. The column of points including the point labeled B
is an example of a vertical crossing the algorithm searches in stage 2. Each point in this column
indicates a value of S realized on the sequence of strategy profiles ~x0 through ~xn defined in (4),
while the point B itself is the value of S nearest the diagonal in this walk.
where ~BA(s) denotes the aggregative best response profile to aggregator s (with each player breaking
ties arbitrarily). The algorithm will first discretize the aggregator space [−W,W ] into a discrete
set Z = {−W,−W + α, . . . ,W − α}, and evaluate V on each point of Z. In Figure 2, the values
of V (s) for each s ∈ Z corresponds to the horizontal line segments. Then the algorithm finds an
equilibrium in two stages.
In the first stage, the algorithm tries to find an approximate fixed point of V in the set Z.
Note that if we could identify an aggregator s such that |V (s) − s| ≤ α, then ~BA(s) forms an
O(α + γ)-approximate equilibrium by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. The algorithm simply checks if
there exist any s ∈ Z that satisfy |V (s)−s| ≤ α. In Figure 2, the existence of an approximate fixed
point corresponds to a crossing point A, as the diagonal line corresponds to the relation Y = X. If
such an s is found, the algorithm will simply suggest that each player i play ~BAi(s) and halt.
Otherwise, the algorithm moves to the second stage, where it again iterates over Z, this time to
find two adjacent aggregators s and s+α such that s > V (s) +α and s < V (s+α)−α. Such pair
of (s, s+α) is guaranteed to exist because a failure in the first stage implies that the two endpoints
satisfy V (−W ) > −W + α and V (W − α) < W − 2α. Intuitively, the value of V is “too high” at
the lower endpoint, and “too low” at the upper endpoint, so there must some “crossing point” s in
the middle where V (s) is close to s.
We can define a sequence of strategy profiles X = {~x0, . . . , ~xn}, where
~xji =
{
~BAi(s) if i ≤ j
~BAi(s+ α) otherwise
(4)
Each profile in X is a combination of some prefix in ~BA(s) and ~BA(s + α). The sequence of
aggregators given by the profiles in X is essentially a walk between V (s) and V (s + α). By the
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assumption of bounded influence, changing the action of one player can change the aggregator value
by at most γ, so every adjacent step in the walk has length no more than γ. Thus there must be an
action profile ~x ∈ X such |V (x)−s| ≤ γ. Note that players’ actions in x come from both ~BA(s) and
~BA(s+ α), so all players are playing an O(α)-aggregative best response to s in x, and by Lemma
2, x forms an O(α+ γ)-approximate equilibrium.
The primary change we make to SummNash is that our algorithm needs to access the players’
aggregative best responses (defined by types) in a privacy-preserving manner. Recall that there are
three main parts that require access to the players’ private data:
1. for each s ∈ Z, check whether V (s) is close to s;
2. for each s ∈ Z, check whether s > V (s) + α and also s < V (s+ α)− α; and
3. for each ~x ∈ X , check whether S(~x) is close to a given s ∈ Z.
To do that, we will first formulate these 3 conditions as 3 different set of queries {Qk}, {Q′k} and
{Q′′k} (detailed in in Algorithm 2), so that we can check these conditions by checking whether the
query values is below some threshold. Note that we only need to identify at most one aggregator
or strategy profile that satisfies each condition even though we are answering a large collection
queries (2W/α + n). We take advantage of this fact by using Sparse, which gives a good accuracy
guarantee, with error scaling logarithmically with the number of queries. This error will eventually
factor into the approximation factor of output Nash equilibrium.
We here state the formal guarantee of the algorithm, and defer the full proof and technical
details to Appendix E.
Theorem 6. PSummNash(t, ε, α, β) satisfies ε-joint differential privacy, and with probability at
least 1− β, computes a (10α+ 2γ)-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium as long as
α ≥ O
(γ
ε
polylog(n,m, 1/β)
)
.
Theorem 5 then follows by instantiating Theorem 2 with PSummNash by setting ε =
√
γ,
β = 1/n and α = 100
√
γ(log(12Wn2)). (Recall that γ < 1, so
√
γ dominates γ).
Future Work
The most interesting open question in this line of work is whether there exists a weak mediator that
implements good behavior in every large game, where we only assume that the influence that any
single player’s action has on the utility of others is diminishing with the number of players. Recall
that in Kearns et al. [2014], it was shown that there exists a strong mediator that implements
good behavior in any large game, by giving an algorithm that privately computes a correlated
equilibrium in any large game. An equivalent result could be shown for weak mediators by giving
an algorithm that is able to compute (under the constraint of joint differential privacy) a Nash
equilibrium, subject only to a largeness condition on the game. Note that such an algorithm would
not be expected to be computationally efficient in general. However, at the moment it remains
open whether such an algorithm exists at all, independent of efficiency concerns. Finally note that
it might be possible to construct weak mediators using tools other than differential privacy – there
is no reason why such mediators could not be deterministic. We do not at present have any other
similarly general tools for constructing these objects, but results using other tools would be of
significant interest.
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ALGORITHM 2: PSummNash(t, ε, α, β)
Data: An n-player type vector t, privacy parameter ε, accuracy parameter α, and confidence
parameter β
Result: A (10α+ 2γ)-approximate Nash equilibrium
Stage 1
for each −W/α ≤ k ≤W/α− 1, define a query Qk on the players’ private payoff functions:
Qk = |V (kα)− kα|
let {ak} = Sparse(t, {Qk}, 4α, 1, ε/3)
// try to find an approximate fixed point for V
if we have some at 6=⊥ then
Output ~BA(tα)
Stage 2
for each −W/α+ 1 ≤ k ≤W/α− 1, define query Q′k on the players’ private payoff functions:
Q′k = max (min(0, kα− V ((k − 1)α)),−2α) + max (min (0, V (kα)− kα) ,−3α)
let {a′k} = Sparse(t, {Q′k},−4α, 1, ε/3)
if all a′k =⊥ then
Abort.
else
let l be the index such that a′l 6=⊥
// define a sequence of strategy profiles for the ‘‘smooth walk’’
for each 0 ≤ j ≤ n, let strategy profile xj be defined as
xji =
{
~BAi(lα) if i ≤ j
~BAi((l − 1)α) otherwise
let query Q′′j = S(x
j)
let {a′′j } = Sparse(t, {Q′′j }, α+ γ/2, 1, ε/3)
if some a′′j′ 6=⊥ then
Output xj
′
else
Abort.
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A Privacy Tools
We first state the formal definition of differential privacy Dwork et al. [2006], which is a measure of
the privacy of computations on databases. In our setting, a database D ∈ T n contains n players’
private types, which determine their utility functions. Two databases are neighboring if they differ
only in a single entry.
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy Dwork et al. [2006]). An algorithm M : T n → R is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for every pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ T n and for every subset of
possible outputs S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
If δ = 0, we say that M is ε-differentially private.
We will make use of the following composition theorem, which shows how the privacy parameters
ε and δ “compose” nicely.
Theorem 7 (Adaptive Composition Dwork et al. [2010]). Let M : T n → RT be a T -fold adaptive
composition10 of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Then M satisfies (ε′, T δ+ δ′)-differential
privacy for
ε′ = ε
√
2T ln(1/δ′) + Tε(eε − 1).
In particular, for any ε ≤ 1, ifM is a T -fold adaptive composition of (ε/√8T ln(1/δ), 0)-differentially
private mechanisms, then M satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
In the remainder of this section, we review two tools from the differential privacy literature,
namely the Sparse Vector Mechanism and the Exponential Mechanism. Both will be used in our
algorithms.
A.1 Sparse Vector Mechanism
Our main tool from differential privacy is a slight modification of the sparse vector mechanism
from Dwork et al. [2009] (we follow the presentation of Dwork and Roth [2014]). The sparse vector
mechanism Sparse takes in a sequence of low-sensitivity queries {Qt} on database D, and a threshold
T . The mechanism only outputs answers to those queries with (noisy) answers below the (noisy)
threshold,11 and reports that all other queries were above threshold. There is also an upper bound
c on the number of queries that can be answered. If more than c queries have answers below the
threshold, the mechanism will abort and not produce an output.
10For a more detailed discussion of T -fold adaptive composition, see Dwork et al. [2010].
11The Sparse Vector Mechanism as presented in Dwork and Roth [2014] only answers queries with answers above a
certain threshold. For the purposes of this paper, we use it instead to answer queries with answers below threshold.
This modification does not change the analysis.
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This mechanism is especially useful if an analyst is facing a stream of queries and believes that
only a small number of the queries will have small answers. The Sparse Vector Mechanism allows
the analyst to identify and answer only the “important” queries, without having to incur privacy
cost proportional to all queries in the stream.
The sensitivity of a query Q, denoted ∆(Q), is an upper bound over all pairs of neighboring
databases on the amount that one entry can affect the answer to the query:
∆(Q) = max
D,D′ s.t. |D∆D′|≤1
|Q(D)−Q(D′)|
Note that because of our restriction to γ-aggregative games in Section 2.1, each coordinate of the
aggregative function is γ-sensitive.
ALGORITHM 3: Sparse Vector Mechanism Sparse(D, {Qt}, T, c, ε)
Data: A private database D, an adaptively chosen stream of queries {Qt} of sensitivity γ, threshold
T , total number of numeric answers c, and privacy parameter ε
Result: A stream of answers {at}
Let T̂ = T + Lap
(
2γ
ε
)
let σ = 2cγε
let count = 0
for each query Qt on database D do
Let νt = Lap(σ) and Q̂t = Qt(D) + νt
if Q̂t ≤ T̂ then
Output at = Q̂t
Update count = count + 1
if count ≥ c then
Abort
else
Output ⊥
Theorem 8 (Dwork et al. [2009]). For any sequence of N queries Q1, . . . , QN such that |{k :
Qk(D) ≤ T + α| ≤ c, Sparse satisfies ε-differential privacy and, with probability at least 1 − β,
releases answers such that for all ak ∈ R,
|ak −Qk(D)| ≤ α,
and for all ak =⊥,
Qk(D) ≥ T − α,
where
α =
4cγ (logN + log(2c/β))
ε
.
A.2 Exponential Mechanism
The exponential mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007] is a powerful private mechanism for
selecting approximately the best outcome from a set of alternatives, where the quality of an outcome
is measured by a score function relating each alternative to the underlying data. Let T n be
the domain of input databases, and R be the set of possible outcomes, then a score function
q : T n × R → R maps each database and outcome pair to a real-valued score. The exponential
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mechanism EXP instantiated with database D, a score function q, and a privacy parameter ε is
defined as
EXP(D, q, ε) = output r with probability proportional to exp
(
εq(D, r)
2∆(q)
)
,
where ∆(q) is the global sensitivity of score function q defined as
∆(q) = max
r,D,D′ s.t. |D∆D′|≤1
|q(D, r)− q(D′, r)|.
Then exponential mechanism has the following property:
Theorem 9 (McSherry and Talwar [2007]). EXP(D, q, ε) satisfies ε-differential privacy and, with
probability at least 1− β, outputs an outcome r such that
q(D, r) ≥ max
r′
q(D, r′)− 2∆(q) (log(|R|/β))
ε
.
A.3 Billboard Model
In order to prove that our algorithms satisfy joint differential privacy, we rely on a basic but useful
framework – the billboard model. Algorithms in the billboard model compute some differentially
private signal (which can be viewed as being visible on a public billboard); then the output given
to each player i is computed as a function only of this private signal, and the private data of
agent i. The following lemma shows that algorithms operating in the billboard model satisfy joint
differential privacy.
Lemma 5 (Billboard Lemma. Hsu et al. [2014a]). Suppose M : T n → R is (ε, δ)-differentially
private. Consider any set of functions Fi : Ti×R → R′, where Ti is the i-th entry of the input data.
The composition {Fi(ΠiD,M(D))} is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private, where Πi is the projection
to i’s data.
B Distributed Multiplicative Weights Algorithm
In order to compute an equilibrium privately, we need to solve the linear program in (2) under
joint differential privacy. This LP has some nice structural properties which allow this to be
possible. In particular, the variables are well partitioned among the n players, such that each
player independently controls a set of variables that must form a probability distribution. Each
player also has a private restricted feasible set defined by her type (she needs to play an approximate
aggregative best response to ŝ according to her private utility function). This motivates us to solve
the following more general linear program:
∀k ∈ [d] γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkij pij = γ〈fk, p〉 ≤ bk (5)
∀i ∈ [n] pi = (pi1, . . . , pim) ∈ Ri ⊆
x ∈ Rm≥0 |∑
j
xj = 1
 (6)
where each
∣∣∣fkij∣∣∣ ≤ 1. In this LP, there are two types of constraints. Each agent has a private
constraint (6) for her own variables, defined by the restricted feasible set Ri. We also have d
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cross-agent constraints (5) that require coordination among the agents. Solving this LP under
joint differential privacy guarantees that the output variables to the other agents, p−i, is insensitive
in agent i’s restricted set Ri. Our goal is to find a solution p that approximately satisfies all d
cross-agent constraints (5) and exactly satisfies all private constraints (6).
Our algorithm DistMW is essentially a distributed version of the multiplicative weights (MW)
update algorithm [Arora et al., 2012].
It proceeds in rounds and has each agent running an instantiation of MW over her own private
variables. At each round t, the algorithm collects the variables from all players pt = (pt1, . . . , p
t
n) ∈
Rmn, and then selects an approximately most violated cross-agent constraint under pt using the
Exponential Mechanism EXP (see Appendix A.2), where the score for a constraint γ〈f, pt〉 ≤ b is
defined as
q(pt, (f, b)) = γ〈f, pt〉 − b. (7)
Note that each cross-agent constraint takes the same form, so constraint γ〈f, pt〉 ≤ b can be fully
described by the pair (f, b). The mechanism then “broadcasts” the selected constraint (f, b), and
each agent i uses the i-th segment of f : fi = (fi1, . . . , fim) as the loss vector to update her
instantiation of the MW distribution. After the re-weighting update at each round, each player
projects her vector of variables into her private restricted set Ri, so the solution always satisfies
the private constraints. Finally, each agent takes the average of the distributions from all rounds
to get her output distribution.
ALGORITHM 4: Distributed Multiplicative Weights for Solving Linear Program: DistMW
(FeasLP, ε, δ, α, β)
Data: A feasibility LP FeasLP of with cross-agent constraints of the form (5), private constraints
of the form (6), and quality score q of the form (7), privacy parameters (ε, δ), accuracy
parameter α, and confidence parameter β
Result: A solution p that satisfies all private constraints and only violates any public constraint by
at most α
Initialize p1 : p1ij = 1/m for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]
Let T =
16n2γ2 logm
α2
ε0 =
ε
2
√
2T ln(1/δ)
η = α/4nγ
For each round t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
Let (f t, bt) = EXP(pt, q, ε0)
Each agent i performs MW update: for each j
p̂t+1ij = exp(−η · f tij) · ptij
Projection with relative entropy:
pt+1i = arg min
x∈Ri
RE(x||p̂t+1i )
Output the average vector p = 1/T
∑T
t=1 p
t
Theorem 10. DistMW(·, ε, δ, ·, ·) satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
Proof. Our algorithm works in the billboard model introduced by [Hsu et al., 2014a]. In particular,
the algorithm posts the violated constraint every round on a billboard as a differentially private
signal to all agents, such that every agent can see the signal and perform the MW update.
The only sub-routines of DistMW that access the private data (i.e. private constraints) are the
constraint selection at every round using the Exponential Mechanism. Thus, our mechanism has T
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instantiations of an (ε0, 0)-differentially private mechanism, where ε0 = ε/(2
√
2T ln(1/δ)). By the
Adaptive Composition Theorem (Theorem 7 in Appendix A), we know that the selected constraints
satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Note that the i-th component of the output is a function only of
the selected constraints and the MW update rule. By Lemma 5, the algorithm satisfies (ε, δ)-joint
differential privacy.
Theorem 11. Suppose there is a feasible solution to FeasLP with cross-agent constraints (5) and
private constraints (6). Then with probability at least 1 − β, DistMW(FeasLP, ε, δ, α, β) outputs
a solution p that satisfies all of the private constraints and α-approximately satisfies all of the
cross-agent constraints, for
α = O
(
nγ2
ε
polylog
(
n,m, d,
1
β
,
1
δ
))1/2
.
Proof. Since each |fkij | ≤ 1, the MW algorithm gives a no-regret guarantee for each agent i:
1
T
∑
t
〈f ti , pti〉 ≤ min
pi∈Ri
1
T
∑
t
〈f ti , pi〉+ η +
log(m)
Tη
= min
pi∈Ri
1
T
∑
t
〈f ti , pi〉+
α
2nγ
for every agent i. Let R = R1 × . . .×Rn, then the joint play of all n agents satisfy
1
T
∑
t
(
γ〈f t, pt〉 − bt) ≤ min
p∈R
1
T
∑
t
(
γ〈f t, p〉 − bt)+ α/2. (8)
Since there is feasible solution to the LP, we know that
min
p∈R
1
T
∑
t
(
γ〈f t, p〉 − bt) ≤ 0,
so from Equation (8),
1
T
∑
t
(
γ〈f t, pt〉 − bt) ≤ α/2. (9)
By Theorem 9, with probability at least 1− β, exponential mechanism gives
∑
t
(
γ〈f t, pt〉 − bt) ≥ max
(f,b)
∑
t
(γ〈f, pt〉 − b)− 2γ log
(
dT
β
)
ε0

and so,
1
T
∑
t
(
γ〈f t, pt〉 − bt) ≥ max
(f,b)
1
T
[∑
t
(
γ〈f, pt〉 − b)]− 2γ log
(
dT
β
)
ε0
(10)
Combining Equations (9) and (10) with the definition of p, we get
max
(f,b)
(γ〈f, p〉 − b) = max
(f,b)
1
T
∑
t
(
γ〈f, pt〉 − b) ≤ 2γ log
(
dT
β
)
ε0
+ α/2 ≤ α,
as long as
2γ log
(
dT
β
)
ε0
≤ α/2. Plugging in for parameter ε0, this condition is equivalent to
α2 ≥
32
√
2nγ2 log
(
dT
β
)√
logm ln
(
1
δ
)
ε
. (11)
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Plugging in T , we get our desired bound
α = O˜
(
nγ2
ε
log
(
dn
β
)√
log(m) ln(1/δ)
)1/2
.
For simplicity, we set the target accuracy to be
α = 100
(
nγ2
ε
log
(
d
β
)
log(n)
√
log(m) ln(1/δ)
)1/2
(12)
when calling DistMW(·, ε, δ, α, β).12
C Details for PRESL
To recap, our goal is to select an approximate pure strategy equilibrium of a γ-aggregative game
such that the objective cost function L is approximately minimized. Before we begin, we need to
first define the benchmark OPT for the cost function, that is, the set of equilibria to which we are
comparing. We first state the following result showing that approximate equilibrium always exists
in large games. It was observed by Kalai [2004] and also proved by Azrieli and Shmaya [2013] using
a concentration argument, and we will state the result in terms of aggregative games.
Theorem 12 (Azrieli and Shmaya [2013]). Let G be a γ-aggregative games with n players and m
actions, then G admits a
(
γ
√
8n log(2mn)
)
-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Given any ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn), let E(ζ) be the set of ζ-approximate pure strategy Nash equi-
libria in the game. We can then define the following benchmark
OPT(ζ) = min{L(~x) | ~x ∈ E(ζ)}.
Now we want to find an (ζ + α)-approximate pure strategy equilibrium that achieves at most
OPT(ζ)+O(α) using PRESL. The algorithm has two stages. In the first stage, we try to identify an
aggregator ŝ ∈ X such that there exists a mixed strategy profile ~p that satisfies three requirements:
1. all players are randomizing between approximate aggregative best responses to ŝ;
2. S(~p) is close to ŝ;
3. and L(~p) is close to OPT(ζ).
We find such an aggregator by solving linear programs based on the discretized set of candidate
aggregators and objective values. In particular, each linear program LP (ŝ, ŷ) is defined by a
aggregator ŝ ∈ X = {−W,−W +α, . . . ,W −α}d and a objective value for L: ŷ ∈ {0, α, 2α, . . . , nγ}.
The sequence of queries we will feed to Sparse is the objective values for these LP’s:
Q = {Q(ŝ, ŷ) | ŝ ∈ X, ŷ ∈ {0, α, . . . , nγ}} ,
12This accuracy level is achievable under mild conditions: as long as ε = O(1), γ < 1 and 1/γ is polynomially
smaller than n50 (we already assume γ = Ω(1/n)), then the α in Equation (12) satisfies Inequality (11).
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Q(ŝ, ŷ) = min a (13)
such that ∀k, γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkijpij ≤ ŝk + a (14)
∀k, −γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkijpij ≤ −ŝk + a (15)
L(~p) ≤ ŷ + a (16)
∀i, ∀j ∈ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ), 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1 (17)
∀i, ∀j /∈ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ), pij = 0 (18)
∀i,
m∑
j=1
pij = 1, (19)
where ξ = γ + ζ + 2α.
We use Sparse to output the first (ŝ, ŷ) such that the approximate answer of Q(ŝ, ŷ) is below
the threshold α + E1, where E1 is the additive error bound for our instantiation of Sparse (given
by Theorem 8). This will guarantee the actual value of Q(ŝ, ŷ) ≤ α+ 2E1.
During the second stage, the algorithm uses DistMW to compute a mixed strategy profile ~p by
solving a modified version of the above LP, denoted LP (ŝ, ŷ), without the objective (13) and with a
replaced by α+2E1 in the constraints. That is, constraints (14)-(16) are further relaxed as follows:
∀k, γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkijpij ≤ ŝk + α+ 2E1 (20)
∀k, −γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkijpij ≤ −ŝk + α+ 2E1 (21)
L(~p) ≤ ŷ + α+ 2E1. (22)
Finally, we will output a pure strategy profile sampled from the distribution defined by ~p.
Theorem 4. Let ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn), ε, δ, β ∈ (0, 1). PRESL(t, ζ, L, ε, δ, β) satisfies (2ε, δ)-joint
differential privacy, and, with probability at least 1 − β, computes a (ζ + 12α)-approximate pure
strategy equilibrium ~x such that L(~x) < OPT(ζ) + 5α, where
α = O
(
(
√
nε+ d) γ
ε
polylog (n,m, d, 1/β, 1/δ)
)
.
Proof. Similar to the privacy proof in Theorem 10, PRESL also works in the Billboard model. Each
player’s action in the output is a function of only the “broadcast” information and her private
type. Note that “broadcast” information comes from both Sparse and DistMW, which together
satisfy (2ε, δ)-differential privacy. By the Billboard Lemma 5, our algorithm satisfies (2ε, δ)-joint
differential privacy.
From Theorem 8, we know that the instantiation Sparse is ε-differentially private, and with
probability at least 1− β/3, has additive error bounded by
err ≤
4γ
(
(d+ 1) log
(
2W
α
)
+ log
(
6
β
))
ε
<
100γ
(
(d+ 1) log(2W ) log(n) + log
(
6
β
))
ε
= E1 < α,
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as long as n25 > 1/α. For the rest of the proof, we condition on this level of accuracy, which is
the case except with probability at most β/3. We know there exists an optimal ζ-approximate
pure strategy equilibrium ~x′ such that L(~x′) = OPT(ζ). Note that each player’s action x′i is ζ-best
response, and is also ξ-aggregative best response (recall ξ = γ + ζ + 2α) to some discretized point
ŝ ∈ X, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 3.
Since we set the threshold of Sparse to be α+ E1, we are guaranteed that Sparse will output a
pair (ŝ, ŷ) such that there exists some mixed strategy ~p with
‖S(~p)− ŝ‖∞ ≤ α+ 2E1 and L(~p) ≤ ŷ + α+ 2E1 ≤ OPT(ζ) + 2α+ 2E1,
and where every player only places weight on actions that are a ξ-aggregative best response to ŝ.
Then ~p is a feasible solution to the second stage linear program, LP (ŝ, ŷ). By Theorem 11,
DistMW will output such a solution ~p where
‖S(~p)− ŝ‖∞ ≤ α+ 2E1 + E2, and L(~p) ≤ OPT(ζ) + 2α+ 2E1 + E2,
except with probability β/3, where
E2 = 100
(
nγ2
ε
log
(
3d
β
)
log(n)
√
log(m) ln(1/δ)
)1/2
< α.
Let ~x be the action profile sampled from the mixed strategy ~p. By McDiarmid’s inequality, for each
coordinate k:
Pr [|Sk(~x)− Sk(~p)| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(−2t2
nγ2
)
, and Pr [|L(~x)− L(~p)| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(−2t2
nγ2
)
.
The union bound gives
Pr [‖S(~x)− S(~p)‖∞ ≥ t or |L(~x)− L(~p)| ≥ t] ≤ (d+ 1)2 exp
(−2t2
nγ2
)
.
Then with probability at least (1− β/3), we can guarantee
|L(~x)− L(~p)|, ‖S(~x)− S(~p)‖∞ ≤
(
nγ2
2
ln
(
6d+ 6
β
))1/2
∆
= E3 < α.
Overall, we can guarantee the following with probability at least 1− β
‖S(~x)− ŝ‖∞ ≤ α+ 2E1 + E2 + E3 < 4α
L(~x) ≤ L(~p) + E3 ≤ OPT(ζ) + 2α+ 2E1 + E2 + E3 < OPT(ζ) + 5α.
In ~x, all players are playing a ξ-aggregative best response to ŝ, so by Lemma 3 they are also
playing a (ξ + 8α)-aggregative best response to S(~x). By Lemma 2, all players in ~x are playing a
(ξ + γ + 8α)-best response. Since γ < α and ξ + γ + 8α < ζ + 12α, then ~x is an (ζ +O(α))-pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
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D Non-Private Equilibrium Computation via LP
Here we show that similar techniques to those presented in Appendix C can be used to non-
privately compute and select approximate equilibrium in γ-aggregative games. In this setting, a
better approximation factor is possible because we no longer need to add noise to preserve privacy.
As before, the algorithm NPRESL approximates the aggregator value domain with a discretized
grid of all possible aggregators X = {−W,−W +α, . . . ,W −α}d, and consider a γ-Lipschitz linear
loss function L : An → R:
L(~x) = γ
∑
i
`i(xi) and L(~p) = γ E
~x∼~p
L(~x) = γ
∑
i
〈pij , `ij〉.
where |`i(aj)| ≤ 1 for all actions aj ∈ A, and `ij = `i(aj).
Let ζ ≥ γ√8n log(2mn), and define
OPT(ζ) = min{L(~x) | ~x ∈ E(ζ)},
where E(ζ) is the set of ζ-approximate pure strategy equilibria in the game.
We first want to find a mixed strategy profile that could achieve the an objective value no
more than OPT(ζ). This can be done by solving LP (23) for every ŝ ∈ X, denoted LP (ŝ), where
ξ = ζ + γ + 2α.
min
p
L(p)
∀k ∈ [d], ŝk − α ≤ γ
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fkijpij ≤ ŝk + α
∀i ∈ [n], ∀j ∈ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ), 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1
∀i ∈ [n], ∀j /∈ ξ- ~BAi(ŝ), pij = 0
∀i ∈ [n],
m∑
j=1
pij = 1
(23)
After solving LP (ŝ) for all ŝ ∈ X, algorithm NPRESL selects the mixed strategy profile ~p that gives
the smallest objective value among all the solutions to the LPs. The algorithm then rounds ~p to
get a pure strategy profile ~x.
ALGORITHM 5: Non-Private Equilibrium Selection via LP: NPRESL(t, α, β)
Data: A type vector t, discretization parameter α, and confidence parameter β
Result: An O˜ (α+
√
nγ)-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium
let s be the aggregator in X that achieves the smallest objective value in LP (ŝ);
let ~p be the solution to LP (s);
let ~x be an action profile sampled from the product distribution ~p;
Output: ~x
Theorem 13. With probability at least 1 − β, NPRESL (t, α, β) computes a (4α+ 2γ + 2E)-
approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium ~x such that L(~x) ≤ OPT +E, where
E = O
(√
nγ polylog(d, 1/β)
)
.
Proof. Since the (unrounded) mixed strategy profile ~p is a feasible solution to LP (s), we know
‖S(~p)− s‖∞ ≤ α.
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We also know that in ~p, every player is playing a ξ-aggregative best response to s, and by
Lemma 3, it follows that she is playing a (ξ + 2α)-aggregative best response to S(~p).
Let ~x be the realized profile by sampling from ~p. By McDiarmid’s inequality, for each coordinate
k:
Pr [|Sk(~x)− Sk(~p)| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(−2t2
nγ2
)
, and Pr [|L(~x)− L(~p)| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(−2t2
nγ2
)
.
The union bound gives
Pr [‖S(~x)− S(~p)‖∞ ≥ t or |L(~x)− L(~p)| ≥ t] ≤ (d+ 1)2 exp
(−2t2
nγ2
)
.
Then with probability at least 1− β, we can guarantee
|L(~x)− L(~p)|, ‖S(~x)− S(~p)‖∞ ≤
(
nγ2
2
ln
(
2d+ 2
β
))1/2
∆
= E.
Thus, with probability at least 1−β, we know that in ~x, each player is playing a (ξ+ 2α+ 2E)-
aggregative best response to S(~x), and is therefore playing a (ξ+2α+2E+γ)-best response. Hence,
we show ~x forms an (ζ + 4α+ 2γ + 2E)-approximate pure strategy equilibrium.
Note that the optimal ζ-approximate pure strategy equilibrium ~x′ with objective value OPT(ζ)
is also a feasible solution to LP (ŝ) for some ŝ ∈ X, so we must have L(~p) ≤ OPT(ζ), which implies
that L(~x) ≤ OPT(ζ) + E.
E Details for Single Dimensional (Quasi)-Aggregative Games
Proof of Theorem 6. Algorithm 2 only accesses the data through three instantiations of Sparse, each
of which satisfy ε/3-differential privacy. By the Composition Theorem in Dwork et al. [2006], these
three computations compose to satisfy ε-differential privacy. Each player’s action in the output
strategy profile is a function only of Sparse’s output and the player’s private data (type). Thus,
the algorithm works in the Billboard model, and by the Billboard Lemma 5, it satisfies ε-joint
differential privacy.
We now prove that the algorithm computes an approximate Nash equilibrium. Let err be the
error in PSummNash due to its calls to Sparse. We know by Theorem 8 that with probability at
least 1− β, all three instantiations of Sparse have error at most
err =
100γ(log(2Wn) + log(6/β))
ε
≤ α,
by our assumption on α. For the rest of the proof we assume this level of accuracy, which is the
case except with probability β.
First, consider the case that our algorithm outputs a strategy profile in stage 1. We claim that
this gives an (10α + γ)-approximate Nash equilibrium. Let ~BA(kα) be the output. Then by the
accuracy level of Sparse,
|V (kα)− kα| ≤ 4α+ err ≤ 5α.
Since each player’s action is an aggregative best response to aggregator value kα, it is also a 10α-
aggregative best response to V (kα) by Lemma 3. Thus, each player is playing a (10α + γ)-best
response as desired by Lemma 2.
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Now suppose that the algorithm does not output anything in stage 1. We argue that it will
output a (6α+ 2γ)-approximate Nash equilibrium in stage 2.
We first show that the algorithm’s second Sparse outputs an index l such that
V ((l − 1)α) < lα < V (lα). (24)
Since Sparse failed to output a strategy profile in stage 1, we know that
|V (kα)− kα| ≥ 4α− err ≥ 3α for all −W/α ≤ k ≤W/α− 1.
Since V (s) is in [−W,W ] for all s, we know that V (−W ) ≥ 3α −W and V (W − α) ≤ W − 4α.
Then there must exist an index l such that
V ((l − 1)α)− lα ≥ 2α, and lα− V (lα) ≥ 3α,
which implies that Q′l = −5α ≤ −4α − err. Such an l satisfies Equation (24) and will also be
identified by Sparse as a below threshold query. Note that any index i which does not satisfy
Equation (24) must have Q′i ≥ −3α ≥ −4a + err, so it will not be identified by the Sparse as a
below threshold query (since we set the threshold to be −4α).
Finally, we claim that we can find an approximate equilibrium between ~BA((l−1)α) and ~BA(lα).
Let xj be the profile defined in Algorithm 2. Then there exists j′ such that
|S(xj′)− lα| ≤ γ/2
Suppose not. Since S(x0) > lα > S(xn), there exists r such that S(xr) > lα > S(xr+1) such that
S(xr)− lα > γ/2, and lα− S(xr+1) > γ/2.
However, this violates our bounded influence assumption: |S(xr+1)− S(xr)| ≤ γ.
Since we set the threshold of the third Sparse to be α+ γ/2, we can find an index j′ such that
|S(xj′)− lα| ≤ 2α+ γ/2.
Note that players in xj
′
are either playing an aggregative best response to aggregative value lα or
(l − 1)α. It suffices to bound the payoff loss for the latter ones:
|S(xj′)− lα| ≤ |S(xj′)− (l − 1)α| ≤ 3α+ γ/2.
Thus an aggregative best response to (l − 1)α remains a (6α + γ)-aggregative best response to
S(xj
′
) by Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, each player can only gain at most γ by deviating from an
apparent best response, thus each player is playing (6α+ 2γ)-best response, which gives at least a
(10α+ 2γ)-approximate equilibrium.
E.1 Private Equilibrium Computation with a Lipschitz Objective
The PSummNash algorithm presented in Section 5.1 allowed us to compute an approximate Nash
equilibrium in any 1-dimensional γ-quasi-aggregative game. However, if the game has multiple
approximate equilibria, it does not guarantee the quality of the equilibrium we obtain. In this
section we propose an algorithm to select the approximate Nash equilibrium of the highest quality
with respect to a given objective. Our algorithm requires the following assumptions on the quasi-
aggregative game and objective:
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Assumption 1 Each player i has a complete ordering i over the action set A, where a i a′ if
and only if S(a, x−i) ≥ S(a′, x−i) for all x−i ∈ An−1. We say player i is playing optimistically if
she is maximizing the aggregator value with her action, and playing pessimistically if minimizing.
Assumption 2 Let q : [−W,W ]→ R be a score function that measures the quality of a aggrega-
tor value, where q(s) is the quality of aggregator value s. We assume that q is λ-Lipschitz in s.
Kearns and Mansour [2002] shows that any γ-quasi-aggregative game admits a 4γ-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium. Given any ζ ≥ 4γ, let E(ζ) be the set of ζ-approximate pure Nash equilib-
rium. Now define
OPT(ζ) = {q(S(~x)) | ~x ∈ E(ζ)}
as our benchmark of the equilibrium quality. We will sometimes write OPT for OPT(ζ) when the
context is clear. We show that our algorithm can compute an (ζ +O(γ))-approximate equilibrium
with quality at least OPT +O(λγ).
Similar to Algorithm 2, this algorithm also iterates through all values s in the discretized
set Z = {−W,−W + α, . . . ,W − α}, with players submitting their approximate aggregative best
response sets to s, ξ- ~BA(s)i. Let X(s) = {~x | each player is playing some xi ∈ ξ- ~BA(s)i}, where
ξ = 2α + γ + ζ. We are searching for an approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium x′ ∈ X(s)
such that |S(x′) − s| ≤ α. Note that the cardinality of X(s) can potentially be Ω(mn), but by
Assumption 1, we can compute the upper and lower bound efficiently
Smax(s) = max
x∈X(s)
S(x), and Smin(s) = min
x∈X(s)
S(x)
by asking players to play optimistically and pessimistically, respectively.
If we find such an s that has an approximate Nash equilibrium strategy profile, there are
three cases: either Smax(s) or Smin(s) is close to s, or s ∈ [Smin(s), Smax(s)]. If we are in the
first two cases, the algorithm simply outputs the corresponding to the optimistic or pessimistic
strategy profile, respectively. In the third case, the algorithm perform the same smooth walk as
in Algorithm 2 from the optimistic profile to the pessimistic profile, and outputs an intermediate
profile x′ such that |S(x′)− s| is small.
Since we are interested in computing the best equilibrium, we iterate through aggregators in
order of their quality score. Let s1  s2  . . .  s2W/α be an ordering over the set of discretized
aggregator values Z, such that q(si) ≥ q(si+1). The algorithm will sequentially consider si according
to this ordering , to compute an approximate equilibrium with aggregator value that maximizes
q.
Theorem 14. For any ζ ≥ 4γ, Algorithm 6 satisfies ε-joint differential privacy, and with probability
at least 1 − β, outputs a (10α + 3γ + ζ)-approximate Nash equilibrium with quality score at least
OPT(ζ)− 5αλ, for any
α ≥ O
(γ
ε
polylog(n,m, 1/β)
)
.
Proof. Algorithm 6 only accesses the data through four instantiations of Sparse, each of which
answers at most one query with ε/4-differential privacy. Again, by the Composition Theorem in
Dwork et al. [2006], these privacy parameters compose so that the strategy profile selection as a
public message satisfies ε-differential privacy. The action of each player is a function of only the
public message and her own private payoff data (type), so by Lemma 5, Algorithm 6 satisfies ε-joint
differential privacy.
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ALGORITHM 6: Private Equilibrium Selection with a Lipschitz Objective
Data: An n-player type vector t, comparator equilibrium class parameter ζ, privacy parameter ε,
accuracy parameter α, and confidence parameter β
Result: (10α+ 3γ + ζ)-approximate Nash equilibrium with quality score at least OPT(ζ)− 5αλ
Initialize: G such that q(G) = −W
for each aggregator value s ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , s2W/α} do
let X(s) = {~x | each player has xi ∈ (2α+ γ + ζ)- ~BA(s)i}
let Smax(s) = maxx∈X(s) S(~x) and Smin(s) = minx∈X(s) S(~x)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2W/α do
let queries
Qk = |Smax(sk)− sk| Q′k = |Smin(sk)− sk|
Q′′k = max (min (Smin(sk)− sk, 0) ,−2α) + max (min (sk − Smax(sk), 0) ,−2α)
let {ak} = Sparse(t, {Qk}, 3α, 1, ε/4)
if some ai 6=⊥ then
let y = xmax(si) and the associated aggregator S
′ = si
let {a′k} = Sparse(t, {Q′k}, 3α, 1, ε/4)
if some a′i 6=⊥ then
if si  S′ then
let y = xmin(si) and the associated aggregator S
′ = si
let {a′′k} = Sparse({t, {Q′′k}, 3α, 1, ε/4)
if some a′′l 6=⊥ then
for each 0 ≤ j ≤ n do
let strategy profile xj be defined as
xji =
{
xmax(sl)i if i ≤ j
xmin(sl)i otherwise
let query Q′′′j = S(x
j)
let {a′′′j } = Sparse(t, {Q′′′j }, α+ γ/2, 1, ε/4)
if some a′′′j′ 6=⊥ then
if sl  S′ then
let y = xj
′
if y is defined then
Output y
else
Abort
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We now prove that Algorithm 6 computes an approximate equilibrium with quality score close
to OPT. We know that with probability at least 1− β, all four instantiations of Sparse have error
at most
err =
100γ(log(2Wn) + log(8/β))
ε
≤ α,
by our assumption on α. For the rest of the argument, we assume this level of accuracy, which is
the case except with probability β.
Suppose that the algorithm outputs a strategy profile ~y from the first two instantiations of
Sparse. Let m be the index of the corresponding query, then
|S(~y)− sm| ≤ 3α+ err ≤ 4α.
Since each player is playing a (2α+γ+ζ)-aggregative best response to sm in the profile ~y, we know
by Lemma 3 that each player is at least playing a (10α+ γ + ζ)-aggregative best response to S(~y),
and so by Lemma 2, a (10α+ 2γ + ζ)-best response.
Suppose that the algorithm does not output anything in the first two instantiations of Sparse.
By the accuracy guarantee, we know that for each si ∈ {s1, . . . , s2W/α},
|Smax(si)− si| ≥ 2α and |Smin(si)− si| ≥ 2α.
Furthermore, we know there must exist a ζ-approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium ~x∗, so each
player in ~x∗ must be playing a (ζ + γ)-aggregative best response to S(~x∗) by Lemma 1. Then by
Lemma 3, the players are playing a (2α + γ + ζ)-aggregative best response for some sl ∈ Z. For
such an sl, it must be the case that |S(~x∗)− sl| ≤ α and ~x∗ ∈ X(sl), so,
Smin(sl) < sl < Smax(sl),
otherwise the first two instantiations of Sparse would have output xmax(sl) or xmin(sl). The third
instantiation of Sparse would find us such an sl. Now as with Theorem 6, we can find a strategy
profile ~z with the last instantiation of Sparse such that ~z is between xmax(sl) and xmin(sl) and,
|S(~z)− sl| ≤ α+ γ/2.
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, each player in ~z is playing a (4α + 2γ + ζ)-aggregative best response
to sl, and so a (4α+ 3γ + ζ)-best response.
Let ~y′ be the equilibrium in E(ζ) that gives quality q(S(~y′)) = OPT. Such an optimal strategy
profile ~y′ would be among the strategy profiles that our algorithm searches. Either we output the
profile ~y′, or we found a different profile ~x associated with a discretized aggregator of higher quality
score (because we enumerate aggregators with higher quality q first). Let s′ be the associated
aggregator to our output profile ~x.
Note that |S(~y′) − s′′| ≤ α for some discretized aggregator s′′ ∈ Z and also |S(~x) − s′| ≤ 4α.
Because the order in which we iterates the aggregators gives priority to higher quality, we know
that q(s′) ≥ q(s′′), so q(S(~x)) ≥ OPT−5αλ.
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